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Janus (in)Decisis: The Role of (Purportedly) Poorly-Reasoned Precedent in the Stare 
Decisis Calculus 
 
Daniel F. Carola 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Supreme Court justices, like the rest of us, hold strong beliefs and convictions.  But when 
those convictions involve the soundness of a challenged precedent, should that affect the Court’s 
stare decisis analysis?  Stare decisis features frequently in some of the most hotly-contested, 
politically-charged Supreme Court decisions of recent decades.  Majorities and minorities alike 
lean on the doctrine with such fervor and frequency that any argument can seemingly be made to 
show stare decisis as either the “preferred course,”1 merely a “principle of policy,”2 or even 
sometimes both in the same opinion.3  Nevertheless, stare decisis and the role of precedent remains 
so pervasively interwoven within our conception of the American legal tradition that it helps 
comprise our understanding of what the law is.4  Though deference to precedent may shape the 
law, what stare decisis is—and is not—remains an evolving and ever-changing formulation.  
The term “stare decisis” comes from the Latin phrase “stare decisis et non quieta moevre,” 
which means “to stand by things decided and not disturb what is tranquil.”5  Given the unsettled 
nature of the doctrine, it is ironic—though perhaps not altogether shocking—that common legal 
parlance omits half of the phrase.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines stare decisis as doctrine 
requiring courts “to abide by authorities or cases already adjudicated upon,” and further refers to 
it as “  [t]he doctrine of precedent, under which it is necessary for a court to follow earlier judicial 
 
 J.D. Candidate, 2020, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., summa cum laude, 2016, Rutgers University. 
1 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991). 
2 Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940). 
3 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 377–78 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).  
4 See Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 748 (1988). 
5 Julie E. Payne, Abundant Dulcibus Vitiis, Justice Kennedy: In Lawrence v. Texas, an Eloquent and Overdue 
Vindication of Civil Rights Inadvertently Reveals What Is Wrong with the Way the Rehnquist Court Discusses Stare 
Decisis, 78 TUL. L. REV. 969, 973 (2004). 
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decisions when the same points arise again in litigation.”6  While understanding a blackletter 
definition does not show the doctrine’s functionality, recent cases display the inconsistent ways in 
which the Court approaches the question of whether to adhere to its own precedent.7  The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Janus v. AFSCME8 only further clouds the doctrinal practicalities of an already 
tough-to-pin-down principle.  Janus ushers in new concerns about the state and direction of stare 
decisis because of the depth of its detailed examination of the quality of the challenged precedent’s 
reasoning.9   
In the wake of Janus, various legal minds have expressed concern with its stare decisis 
implications.  Justice Kagan’s dissent decried the “subver[sion of] all known principles of stare 
decisis,” noting the majority’s disregard for the heavy reliance interests at stake.10  Professor 
Fuentes-Rohwer considers Janus a “judicial foray into a politically charged controversy,” thus 
raising concerns about the Court’s legitimacy.11  Focus on poorly-reasoned precedent and Justice 
Kennedy’s departure from the Court present further questions.  By joining the Janus majority, 
Justice Kennedy affirmed the view that a past precedent may be set aside because of the quality of 
its reasoning.12  Should Justice Kavanaugh share different views than his predecessor on concepts 
like substantive due process, the Court could question the reasoning of precedents comprising 
 
6 Stare Decisis, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (B.A. Garner ed. 2014). 
7 While stare decisis refers to the level of deference a court gives to a prior opinion, it is important to distinguish 
between which court is interpreting which precedent for the purposes of this comment.  Vertical stare decisis refers to 
a lower court’s adherence to a higher court’s precedent and the binding authority that precedent has.  See Jeffrey C. 
Dobbins, Structure and Precedent, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1453, 1460 (2010).  This Comment does not examine or 
reference vertical stare decisis.  Rather, it proceeds with an exposition and discussion of horizontal stare decisis, how 
a court—here, the United States Supreme Court—interprets and defers to its own precedent.  Id. at 1461.  Thus, as 
referenced herein, the term “stare decisis” refers only to the Supreme Court’s treatment of its own precedent. 
8 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).  
9 John O. McGinnis, How Janus Weakens Stare Decisis, L. & LIBERTY (2018), 
https://www.lawliberty.org/2018/06/29/how-janus-weakens-stare-decisis/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2018). 
10 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2497–99, (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
11 Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Taking Judicial Legitimacy Seriously, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 505, 507 (2018). 





Kennedy’s legacy.13  The Cato Institute embraced the decision’s stare decisis framework that they 
claim “largely mirrored” key portions of their amicus brief.14  Professor McGinnis of Northwestern 
University believes Roe v. Wade (finding the right to privacy encompasses a woman’s right to an 
abortion)15 and Morrison v. Olsen (affirming the constitutionality of the independent counsel 
statute)16 are potentially open to criticism based on their reasoning.17  After all, divergent views 
on constitutional interpretation inform whether a particular justice agrees with the reasoning of a 
past precedent.18  What may be poorly-reasoned to a textualist could at the same time contain 
sound legal theory to a legal pragmatist.19  
Stare decisis promotes some of the most vital, yet fragile underpinnings of our judicial 
system.  The doctrine supports notions of certainty, consistency, and impartiality.20  Stare decisis 
is essential to the rule of law because of the importance of stability and moderation.21  These values 
are imperative to the vitality and health of the legal system.22  The doctrine imposes judicial 
restraint by preventing justices from “reconsider[ing] every potentially disputable issue as if it 
were being raised for the first time . . . .”23  Further, because “public acceptance of judicial decision-
making is grounded on an apolitical picture of judges as interpreters of the law,” the Court’s respect 
for stare decisis, particularly on a matter on which there is grave political pressure, serves as an 
 
13 Id.  
14 Ilya Shapiro & Aaron Barnes, Janus: Why It Was Proper (and Necessary) to Overturn Old Precedent, CATO 
INSTITUTE (June 28, 2018, 10:02 AM), https://www.cato.org/blog/janus-why-it-was-proper-necessary-overturn-old-
precedent. 
15 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  
16 487 U.S. 654 (1988).  
17 McGinnis, supra note 9.   
18 See generally Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 80 (2004).  
19 McGinnis, supra note 9.   
20 See Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis As A Constitutional Requirement, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 43, 108–09, (2001). 
21 Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 281, 289 (1990). 
22 See Healy, supra note 20, at 111.   
23 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 570, 573 (2001). 
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integral part of the Court’s survival.24  A more flexible iteration of the stare decisis doctrine— 
employing mechanisms by which mere disagreement with past precedent weighs heavily against 
retaining what had theretofore been the law of the land—would rob precedent of any weight 
whatsoever.25 
If five justices feel that a challenged precedent is supported by what they consider bad 
reasoning, does that, has that, and should that weigh against overturning precedent?  To answer 
these questions, this Comment will scrutinize the genesis and evolution of the poorly-reasoned 
consideration and how that factors into the Court’s recognized stare decisis framework.  In Part II, 
this Comment will analyze the Court’s decision in Janus with particular focus on the majority’s 
treatment of stare decisis.  Part III will examine the historical progression of precedent to 
demonstrate its evolution over time.  In Part IV, this Comment will offer a thorough exposition of 
the present factors which comprise the doctrine and important cases which implicate and explain 
stare decisis.  Part V will review the poorly-reasoned factor, beginning with its origins, tracking 
its usage, analyzing how its consideration in Janus differs from prior usage, and the inherent 
problems with the appearance of judicial politicization and subjectivity.  Part VI will argue for a 
clarification of the poorly-reasoned standard, address different possibilities by considering varying 
degrees of focus on the reasoning of a challenged precedent, and ultimately advocate for a middle-
ground approach that incorporates the consideration but limits the role it can play in a decision to 
ultimately overturn past precedent.  This normative proposal urges that consideration of a 
precedent’s reasoning be non-dispositive, grounding any reasoning defects in objective concerns.  
Lastly, Part VII will offer a brief conclusion. 
 
24 Vanessa Laird, Planned Parenthood v Casey: The Role of Stare Decisis, 57 MOD. L. REV., 461, 467 (1994). 




II. JANUS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
To understand the renewed scrutiny the Court put upon the stare decisis doctrine, one must 
fully understand the recent precedent-overturning case that brought it to the forefront.  Mark Janus 
was a child support specialist for the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services, who, 
as an Illinois public employee, was permitted to unionize under state law.26  When a majority of 
public workers opt for union protection, the union becomes the only entity which may negotiate 
labor contracts with that respective public institution.27  The American Federation of State, County, 
and Municipal Employees, Council 31 (the “AFSCME”) represents approximately 35,000 public 
workers in Illinois.28  Because Mr. Janus disagreed with policy positions for which the union 
advocated, he opted out of union membership.29  Mr. Janus therefore was not required to remit full 
union dues, but instead paid a lesser, so-called “agency fee.”30  This covered the costs of collective 
bargaining, but not the AFSCME’s political activities with which he disagreed.31  Even though he 
was not a union member, Mr. Janus’s compensation, benefits, and other terms of employment were 
set by the collectively-bargained contract, which the AFSCME negotiated in part on his behalf.32   
In an earlier case, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of agency fees in the public sector context.33  There, all nine justices agreed that 
a public labor union could require non-members to pay fees to support the collective bargaining 
pursuits without impinging upon the non-members’ constitutional rights.34  These arrangements 
were permissible so long as the funds collected went toward activities germane to collective 
 
26 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2461.  
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 2461. 
29 Id. 
30 Id at 2460–61. 
31 Id. 
32 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2467. 
33 431 U.S. 209 (1977).  
34 Id. at 226. 
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bargaining and not to ideological or political causes.35  The Court rested its decision on two other 
decisions which similarly held such arrangements permissible in the private-sector union context.36  
The only union due schemes that implicate the First Amendment are those which require public, 
non-union-member employees to support political speech with which they disagree.37   
Overturning Abood and writing for the majority, Justice Alito in Janus held that extraction 
of agency fees from public sector employees unwilling to join their union did violate the First 
Amendment and that Abood was wrong in holding otherwise.38  The Court analyzed the Abood 
doctrine under applicable First Amendment principles, finding the precedent an outlier among 
First Amendment cases.39  More recent cases found that the justifications for Abood did not 
withstand exacting scrutiny.40  After holding that Illinois’s scheme violated the First Amendment, 
the Court then addressed whether the doctrine of stare decisis nevertheless weighed against 
overruling Abood.   
Stare decisis is the favored approach, the majority began, “because it promotes the 
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on 
judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”41  
The doctrine, the Court recalled, is weaker in cases which interpret the Constitution, and perhaps 
even at its weakest in decisions which wrongly deny First Amendment rights.42  Alito listed 
 
35 Id. at 235–36.  
36 Id. at 226 (“[Hanson and Street] appear to require validation of the agency-shop agreement before us.”).  
37 Id. at 236.  
38 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486. 
39 Id. at 2482. 
40 See, e.g., Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2641 (2014). 
41 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2478 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 827 (1991)).  
42 Id.  
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standard stare decisis considerations but added an additional, more infrequent factor: the quality 
of the challenged precedent’s reasoning.43    
Opting to address the reasoning factor first in the Court’s stare decisis analysis, Alito 
recited dicta from Harris v. Quinn, written just four years prior.44  In Harris, the Court could not 
reach the issue of agency fee permissibility to rule on Abood’s constitutionality because the 
plaintiffs were not public sector employees per se.45  Nevertheless, Harris still thoroughly and 
categorically condemned Abood’s reasoning, concluding that it had “questionable foundations,”46 
even though the merits of Abood were not at issue.47  Janus also attacked Abood by contending 
that it fundamentally misunderstood the legal precedents applied, failed to appreciate the primary 
distinction between public and private-sector collective bargaining, neglected the extent to which 
the rule would lead to administrative dilemmas, and lacked the foresight to appropriately gauge 
the impact the rule would have on nonmembers.48  So thorough is Alito’s discrediting of Abood’s 
premises in Harris that, in Janus, he states that he “will summarize, but not repeat, Harris’s lengthy 
discussion of the issue.”49  The language in the two pages in Janus detailing Abood’s shortcomings 
closely tracks the seven pages from Harris which discussed the same issue.50     
 
43 Id. at 2478–79 (“Our cases identify factors that should be taken into account in deciding whether to overrule a past 
decision.  Five of these are most important here: the quality of Abood’s reasoning, the workability of the rule it 
established, its consistency with other related decisions, developments since the decision was handed down, and 
reliance on the decision.”).  The evolution of this consideration as a stare decisis factor and its ramifications are 
addressed at length in Part V, infra. 
44 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).  
45 Id. at 2638.  
46 Id. at 2632–38.  
47 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2479.  Abood relied principally on two cases—Hanson and Street—which, as Alito discussed 
in Harris, were inapplicable because of the inherent differences between public and private sector employers in union 
agency fee contexts.  Because of the unwarranted reliance on these two cases, Abood addressed the constitutionality 
of agency fees under weaker scrutiny not typically employed in speech cases.  This more deferential standard, Alito 
contended, allowed the Abood court to deem that the purported state interests, labor peace and free rider mitigation, 
passed Constitutional muster.  Id. at 2480.  
48 Id. at 2478–81.  
49 Id. at 2483 (emphasis added). 
50 Compare Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2479–81, with Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2627–34 (2014).  
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The remainder of Janus’s stare decisis analysis generally accords with the considerations 
from Planned Parenthood v. Casey.51  Janus questioned Abood’s workability because it created a 
rule which had proven “impossible to draw with precision.”52  In the intervening decades since 
Abood, the Court clarified the test used to determine which types of union activities were 
chargeable to non-members and which activities were non-chargeable because they crossed the 
boundaries into compelled speech.53  Further, the Janus respondents, while advocating for 
retaining Abood, conceded that the chargeable/non-chargeable distinction was vague and 
sometimes led to erroneous results.54  Indeed, the respondents themselves agreed that the Court 
could draw a firmer line.55  Alito explained that this concession “only underscores the reality that 
Abood has proved unworkable: not even the parties defending [it] support the line that it has taken 
this Court over 40 years to draw.”56 
Alito’s stare decisis examination also recognized changes to both the legal and factual 
underpinnings of Abood that weighed in favor of its overruling.57  Abood was an outlier among the 
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, as referenced in its precursors, Knox and Harris.58  From 
a factual standpoint, Abood received similar heavy criticism.  Abood did not require, but merely 
 
51 See infra Part IV.C.  
52 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2459.  
53 See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 519 (1991) (devising a three-part test requiring that chargeable 
expenses be “germane” to collective bargaining, “justified” by the government’s interests as explained in Abood, and 
not significantly further burden free speech.).  This was not the first time that the Court addressed Abood.  See also, 
Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 306 (1986) (requiring a union to provide nonmembers 
with “sufficient information to gauge the propriety of the union’s fee.”).  
54 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2481. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 2482. 
57 Id. at 2483. 
58 See id. at 2463 (quoting Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 311 (2012) (“[I]n more recent 
cases we have recognized that this holding is ‘something of an anomaly.’”); See also Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2627 (“[I]n 
Knox . . . we pointed out that Abood is ‘something of an anomaly.’”).  But see Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 
1000, 567 U.S. 298, 311 (“Acceptance of the free-rider argument as a justification for compelling nonmembers to pay 
a portion of union dues represents something of an anomaly.”). 
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permitted, states to adopt agency fee arrangements.59  By the time the Court heard Janus, some 
twenty-two states had statutory and regulatory schemes based in whole or in part on the Abood 
precedent.60  Free-rider mitigation and labor peace—the interests found by Abood to warrant 
permission of agency fees—had not run amok in any of the twenty-eight states which opted not to 
adhere to the doctrine.61  On the contrary, Alito asserted, the years between Abood and Janus had 
shown the folly of such heavy-handed public employment focus.62  The public fiscal crises 
propelled by rising salaries and pension underfunding in many of the states requiring Abood-like 
arrangements bore this out.63  The Abood court did not have the evidence of its own experiment to 
consider.64 
While the dissent and the respondents strongly advanced reliance interests as the most 
pervasive factor weighing in favor of retaining Abood, the majority, while purportedly 
understanding these concerns, felt dependence on reliance interests “lacked decisive weight.”65  
The statutory schemes of twenty-two states—primarily large, populous states like Illinois, 
California, and New York—permitting Abood-based agency fees were part of the legal framework 
upon which hundreds of public union contracts existed and balanced.66  Even though agency fee 
availability likely factored into the bargaining process at the time of the negotiation of these untold 
thousands of applicable contracts, reliance interests were not determinative because, as Alito 
wrote, “it would be unconscionable to permit free speech rights to be abridged in perpetuity in 
 
59 Abood, 431 U.S. at 217–34.  
60 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2466. 
61 Id. 
62 Id.  
63 Id. at 2483 (noting that the “ascendance of public-sector unions has been marked by a parallel increase in public 
spending . . . .  Not all that increase can be attributed to public-sector unions, of course, but the mounting costs of 
public-employee wages, benefits, and pensions undoubtedly played a substantial role.”).   
64 Id.  
65 Id. at 2484. 
66 See Brief of Mayor Eric Garcetti et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 
2448 (2018) (No. 16-1466) LEXIS 158.  
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order to preserve contract provisions that will expire on their own in a few years’ time.”67  
Contractual interests could not overcome the vindication of constitutional rights.68  Given the 
Court’s fairly recent tact against Abood, as shown in Knox, Harris, and Friedrichs v. California 
Teachers Association,69 public unions should have been on notice that Abood’s days were 
effectively numbered.70  The Janus decision took eight pages to summarize, explain, and evaluate 
whether the stare decisis doctrine weighed against or in favor of overruling Abood.71  While 
precedent-overruling inquiries do not always receive comprehensive treatment, the extent to which 
the majority addressed stare decisis provided the dissent with ample opportunity to critique it.72  
Justice Kagan’s dissent in Janus took issue with the merits of the case and the quality of 
the majority’s reasoning, but also addressed what the four-justice dissent considered the 
“trivializ[ing] [of] stare decisis.”73  The dissent cited some serious concerns regarding the state of 
the stare decisis doctrine in light of the decision to abandon Abood.  The Court “succeed[ed] in its 
6-year campaign to reverse” Abood.74  Because neither Knox nor Harris addressed the ultimate 
question addressed in Janus, Kagan explained, such heavy reliance on them was as misplaced as 
 
67 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2484 (majority opinion); But see Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2499 (Kagan, J., dissenting) 
(“[c]onsiderations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where 
reliance interests are involved.” (quoting Payne, 501 U. S. at 828); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233 (2009) 
(“Considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where 
reliance interests are involved.” (quoting Payne, 501 U. S. at 828)).  Justice Alito authored the majority opinion in 
Pearson which quoted this line, but the decision in Janus did not.  
68 Id. at 2484.  Severability clauses served as a built-in safe guard against contractual chaos for reasons like Abood’s 
overturning.  Id. at 2485.  
69 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016).  
70 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2485.  After the decisions in Knox and Harris, the Court granted certiorari in Friedrichs v. 
California Teachers Association in January 2016, but the death of Justice Scalia the following month resulted in an 
evenly-decided court issuing a per curium opinion in March that same year.  James Taranto, The Lawyers Who Beat 
the Unions, WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-lawyers-who-beat-the-unions-
1530314801.  
71 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2478–86.  
72 See Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 599 (2011).  
73 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
74 Id. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting).   
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the inexplicable and unnecessary depth of analysis Abood’s reasoning received within them.75  
Additionally, because so many binding contracts were negotiated with the understanding that 
agency fee arrangements would remain the law of the land, reliance interests remained profound.76   
Concerning the reasoning of the challenged precedent, while the dissent argued that Abood 
“fit comfortably” within existing First Amendment principles, the majority’s contention that 
Abood was poorly reasoned was insufficient to warrant overturning.77  Finding that all stare decisis 
considerations weighed in favor of retaining Abood, Kagan concluded that “[t]he majority has 
overruled Abood for no exceptional or special reason, but because it never liked the decision. It 
has overruled Abood because it wanted to.”78  By “pick[ing] the winning side,” “black-robed 
rulers” are now permitted to “intervene in economic and regulatory policy” by using the First 
Amendment as a weapon.79 
As with most decisions fraught with political implications, Janus received a mixed 
reaction.  Labor unions are generally seen as proponents of the Democratic Party, in large part 
because the Democratic Party has long advocated for workers’ rights, including the right of labor 
to organize.80  For that reason, any weakening of labor unions, either legislatively or judicially, is 
often seen as motivated by partisan politics and a desire to weaken the Democratic Party.81    
Punctuating this point, President Trump, on the morning of Janus’s announcement, hailed the 
decision with a tweet which laid bare the partisan implications: “Supreme Court rules in favor of 
 
75 See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2498 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Relying on [Knox and Harris] is bootstrapping—and 
mocking stare decisis. Don’t like a decision? Just throw some gratuitous criticisms into a couple of opinions and a few 
years later point to them as ‘special justifications.’”). 
76 See id. at 2499 (Kagan, J., dissenting).   
77 Id. at 2498 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
78 Id. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
79 Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
80 See James Feigenbaum, Alexander Hertel-Fernandez & Vanessa Williamson, From the Bargaining Table to the 
Ballot Box: Political Effects of Right to Work Laws, 3 (Jan. 30, 2018), https://jamesfeigenbaum.github.io/research/ 
pdf/fhw_rtw_jan2018.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2018).  
81 Id. at 29–30 (finding that Democratic candidates receive fewer votes when states weaken labor unions).   
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non-union workers . . . Big loss for the coffers of the Democrats!”82  Other reactions dealt with the 
more practical ramifications of the decision for public employees at large.  Some non-union public 
school teachers brought suits against their unions to recover previously-withheld agency fees.83  
The organization National Right to Work created a “Janus Task Force” to help assist nonmembers 
with opting out of their agency fees to ensure compliance with the new decision.84  For some, the 
debate waged on, with some commentators taking issue with the premises which laid the 
groundwork for the decision.85  If one cannot opt out of paying property taxes that fund public 
schools—the opinions and teachings of which one may disagree—then compelled speech in the 
agency fee context should be viewed no differently.86   
Concerns with a looser iteration of stare decisis principles accelerated with the retirement 
of Justice Kennedy.  By siding with the Janus majority, Kennedy agreed that a constitutional 
precedent could be cast aside based on the quality of its reasoning.87  This “downgrading” of stare 
decisis to a “pliable consideration” will permit future courts to reverse some of Kennedy’s own 
landmark opinions.88  The ensuing Kavanaugh confirmation hearings brought stare decisis to the 
 
82 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 27, 2018, 7:11 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump 
/status/ 1011975204778729474.  
83 Kat Green, Calif. Teachers Sue To Recover Past Union Dues Post-Janus, LAW360 (Jul. 3, 2018), 
https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/ab71c620-1faf-4e5e-b07b-018cc4202728/?context=1000516.  Alito 
concluded his majority opinion by noting: “It is hard to estimate how many billions of dollars have been taken from 
nonmembers and transferred to public-sector unions in violation of the First Amendment.” Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486.  
84 Vin Gurrieri, 4 Post-Janus Developments You Need To Know, LAW360 (June 28, 2018), 
https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/ee9742cf-1bc6-458c-80b8-ec7dcd79bb43/ ?context =1000516. 
85 See Eugene Volokh, ‘The bedrock principle that, except perhaps in the rarest of circumstances, no person … may 
be compelled to subsidize speech by a third party that he or she does not wish to support’, WASH. POST: VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (June 30, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/30/the-
bedrock-principle-that-except-perhaps-in-the-rarest-of-circumstances-no-person-may-be-compelled-to-subsidize-
speech-by-a-third-party-that-he-or-she-does-not-wish-to-support/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.bc7a875eea55.  
86 Id.  
87 Jonathan Turley, Kennedy's Decisions Might Not Last, it Might Be His Own Fault, WASH. POST, June 28, 2018, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/kennedys-decisions-may-not-last-it-might-be-his-own-fault/2018/06/28/ 
e39c3298-7a87-11e8-aeee-4d04c8ac6158_story.html?utm_term=.b4d62c6d9ef9. 
88 Id. (noting that landmark decisions like Lawrence v. Texas (invalidating anti-sodomy laws), Obergefell v. Hodges 
(recognizing the Constitution affords same-sex couples a right to marry), Planned Parenthood v. Casey (reaffirming 
a woman’s right to choose to end her pregnancy) were all five-to-four decisions which could be at risk given the focus 
on a past-precedent’s reasoning, a “perfect weapon for activist judges.”).  
14 
 
forefront, with concerns among many that Kavanaugh’s presence on the Court could represent a 
fifth vote to overturn Roe v. Wade.89  In her much-anticipated remarks on the Senate floor, Senator 
Susan Collins echoed these concerns, speaking to then-Judge Kavanaugh’s conception of stare 
decisis, stating:  
He believes that precedent is not just a judicial policy, it is constitutionally dictated 
to pay attention and pay heed to rules of precedent.  In other words, precedent isn't 
a goal or an aspiration, it is a constitutional tenet that has to be followed, except in 
the most extraordinary circumstances . . . .  When I asked him would it be sufficient 
to overturn a long-established precedent if five current justices believed that it was 
wrongly decided, he emphatically said no.90  
 
Despite Kavanaugh’s insistence that stare decisis ought to be respected, concerns with the 
ultra-partisan perception of the Court, coupled with the acrimoniousness of the latter Kavanaugh 
hearings, lead some to question whether the new Court, as constituted, will attempt to safeguard 
its perception or dive further into partisan turmoil.91  While Justice Kavanaugh’s confirmation 
underscored the deep partisan judicial divide, it also inadvertently magnified concerns about 




89 See Carole Joffe, With the appointment of Brett Kavanaugh, Roe v. Wade is likely dead, WASH. POST (July 10, 2018) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2018/07/10/with-the-appointment-of-brett-kavanaugh-
roe-v-wade-is-likely-dead/?utm_term=.842cb96619c6; Kimberly Atkins, Brett Kavanagh tips scales against Roe v. 
Wade, BOSTON HERALD (Oct. 10, 2018), 
http://www.bostonherald.com/news/columnists/kimberly_atkins/2018/10/brettkavanaughtipsscalesagainstroevwade.   
90 Abigail Abrams, Here’s Sen. Susan Collins’ Full Speech About Voting to Confirm Kavanaugh, TIME (Oct. 5, 2018) 
http://time.com/5417444/susan-collins-kavanaugh-vote-transcript/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2018). Interestingly, the 
contention that stare decisis is constitutionally required is one that legal academics across the ideological spectrum 
agree on.  See e.g. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the 
Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1549 (2000) (noting that “there is no ‘stare decisis clause’ 
in the constitution or anything that can fairly be read as creating one”); Healy, supra note 25, at 1180 (concluding that 
“stare decisis is not dictated by the Framers’ assumptions about the nature of judicial power”).    
91 See Joan Biskupic, For Supreme Court, Kavanagh Marks a Partisan Turning Point, CNN (Sept. 29, 2018)   
https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/28/politics/supreme-court-partisanship-kavanaugh/index.html (last visited Oct. 21, 
2018).  Despite Chief Justice Roberts’ persistent concern with the Supreme Court’s partisan perception, Kavanagh, 
after lamenting in his September confirmation hearing testimony that Democrats were “lying in wait” to derail his 
nomination, warned “what goes around comes around.”  Id.  
15 
 
III. THE PROGRESSION OF STARE DECISIS  
The doctrine’s utility and evolution have changed since early concepts of precedential 
deference first permeated the English common law tradition.  Legal developments in England 
helped spur the use of stare decisis in the Colonies, which then took firm jurisprudential root in 
the nineteenth century.  Perhaps not surprisingly, the way courts interpret the weight accorded the 
doctrine has fluctuated over time.  As the ideology of the Supreme Court oscillates, stare decisis 
naturally factors more heavily in trickier 5-4 decisions as justices grapple with discarding or 
retaining established legal principles.  The Court’s ideological back-and-forth in the twentieth 
century produced some foundational decisions which altered the doctrine.  These changes helped 
force the dilemma brought on by Janus.  Tracing the function of precedent from England to the 
present-day provides the necessary context for this inquiry.   
A. Precedent from England to The Founding Era 
The examination of stare decisis necessarily requires a review of the doctrine’s historical 
underpinnings to fully understand the role of precedent and the shifting trajectory of the doctrine’s 
effect on the Court’s jurisprudence.  Traditions of consulting prior decisions to guide judicial 
opinions have roots in the legal histories of the Egyptian, Greek, and Roman civilizations.92  
Merely consulting prior decisions for their knowledge, however, is far different from a system of 
legal analysis where prior decisions bind future decisions.93  Holding a judge to a past decision 
with which he disagrees is a concept unique to common law courts.94  The role of precedent as a 
controlling principle first began to develop and take hold in England during the Middle Ages.95  
 
92 Healy, supra note 20, at 54.  
93 See Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Precedent and Stare Decisis: The Critical Years, 1800 to 1850, 3 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 
28, 30, 41 (1959). 
94 Harold J. Berman & Charles J. Reid Jr., The Transformation of English Legal Science: From Hale to Blackstone, 
45 EMORY L.J. 437, 445 (1996). 
95 Healy, supra note 20, at 54. 
16 
 
At this time, judges would review news of past cases distilled in compilations called Year Books.96  
During this period, a judge was free to disregard any past decision or court procedure with which 
he disagreed.97  After Year Book publication concluded by the mid-sixteenth century, private case 
reports took their place.98  Though partially unreliable, these private reports helped support the 
growing legal attitude that common law courts should more readily adhere to their past 
precedents.99   
Though the use of precedent goes back to some of the earliest recorded legal histories, the 
formal doctrine of stare decisis—that precedent binds a court—is a relatively recent legal 
development.100  The doctrine, as recognized today, began to develop in the late-eighteenth and 
early-nineteenth centuries.101  Preeminent English jurist Sir William Blackstone envisioned 
precedent as a role of “general obligation.”102  He was the most influential scholar to advocate for 
a strong version of stare decisis, considering it “an established rule to abide by former precedents, 
where the same points come again in litigation . . . .”103  Adherence to precedent was required “to 
keep the scale of justice . . . [from] waver[ing] with every new judge’s opinion.”104  While 
Blackstone’s work served as a turning point in common law conceptions of stare decisis, it also 
influenced the Founders’ knowledge of a jurisprudential ideal.105 
 
96 Id. at 58.  Year Books differed greatly from modern law reports in that they did not often report the legal reasoning 
behind judicial decisions, instead focusing more on the intricate facts of the particular controversy.  See id.  Year 
Books were not regarded as a collection of binding precedents.  See THEODORE F. T PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY 
OF THE COMMON LAW 272 (2010) (ebook).   
97 Berman & Reid Jr., supra note 94, at 445.  
98 Id. at 446.  
99 Id.  
100 Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND.  
L. REV. 647, 659 (1999). 
101 Id. at 661.  
102 Id.  
103 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69. 
104 Id.  
105 See Lee, supra note 100, at 662 (noting that Blackstone’s work coincided with the Framer’s drafting of the 
Constitution).  Blackstone’s influence on the Framers’ understanding has been broadly accepted. See id. at 661 n.71. 
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In its infancy, notions of stare decisis and the controlling role of precedent served as 
foundational legal hallmarks passed down from common law courts to United States courts.106  
The role of precedent in the early American legal system evolved initially as a measure to help 
constrain the monarch’s power.107  Though lacking a cohesive or unified understanding of the role 
of precedent, the courts of the early American legal system were nevertheless imbued with a sense 
that precedent was a fundamental concept.108  In addition to the Framers’ awareness of 
Blackstone’s work on expounding and codifying legal principles,109 Alexander Hamilton 
referenced the importance of precedent in the Federalist Papers.110  In Federalist No. 78, Hamilton 
wrote “[t]o avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound 
down by strict rules and precedents which serve to define and point out their duty in every 
particular case that comes before them.”111  Taken out of context, one could view Hamilton’s 
remarks as a whole-hearted endorsement of stare decisis.112  This passage was written as part of 
an argument for life tenure for judges, illustrating that they would require many years to familiarize 
themselves with procedures and the law.113  
Other Founding-era scholars with legal influence provided more thoughtful and forceful 
commentary on the role of stare decisis.  Madison espoused a more thorough view of the doctrine, 
 
See also Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 69 (1904) (stating that the Commentaries are “the most satisfactory 
exposition of the common law of England,” which the Framers themselves were “undoubtedly” acquainted).  
106 Mortimer N. S. Sellers, The Doctrine of Precedent in the United States of America, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 67, 67 
(2006). 
107 Id.  
108 See id. at 67–68. 
109 See Lee, supra note 100, at 661 n.71.  
110 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
111 Id. 
112 See Lee, supra note 100, at 663 (contending that Federalist No. 78 is not a “comprehensive exposition” of the stare 
decisis doctrine).  
113 Healy, supra note 20, at 100–01.  It is far from certain that Hamilton’s discussion about precedent in Federalist 
No. 78 was related to vertical stare decisis, and not whether or when the Supreme Court could overrule its own 
decisions.  See Lee, supra note 100, at 664. 
18 
 
in part as a result of his experience.114  He wrote that “precedents, when formed on due discussion 
and consideration . . . [were to be] . . . regarded as of binding influence, or, rather, of authoritative 
force in settling the meaning of a law.”115  Formed as a result of his shifting belief on the 
constitutionality of the Bank of the United States, Madison conceived a view of stare decisis where 
deference to precedent was permissible when a legal opinion thoughtfully explained or construed 
a law or the Constitution, but not when the opinion went so far as to change the meaning of it.116  
Similarly, William Cranch, the Supreme Court’s second official reporter, wrote that “every case 
decided is a check upon the judge,” and that judges should not depart from precedent without 
“strong reasons.”117  While some scholars remain skeptical about the extent to which early-
American legal writers intended to enshrine precedent within our founding documents,118 the 
development and pervasiveness of stare decisis shortly thereafter cannot be questioned.119 
The nineteenth century saw a dramatic increase in American judicial commitment to stare 
decisis.120  Two distinct and varied occurrences spurred the growth of the doctrine: the rise of legal 
positivism and the increased availability of law reports.121  Law reports—recorded transcriptions 
of judicial decisions—initially sparse and unreliable in the late 1700s, were widespread and 
reliable by the mid-nineteenth century.122  Positivist legal thought continued to take hold from the 
writings of Jeremy Bentham and John Austin, promoting the more widespread belief that cases 
were law, not mere evidence of law.123  As reports of judicial decisions became widely circulated, 
 
114 Lee, supra note 100, at 664. 
115 Id. at 665.  
116 Id. 
117 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at iii (1801).  
118 Healy, supra note 25, at 1182.  
119 Healy, supra note 20, at 87. 
120 Id.; see also Kempin, Jr., supra note 93, at 34.  
121 Healy, supra note 20, at 87.  
122 Kempin, Jr., supra note 93, at 35–36.  
123 Id. at 32, 36.   
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so too grew the belief among scholars that those decisions themselves comprised law.  From this, 
a more recognizable version of stare decisis took root and developed to what we see today.  
B.  Twentieth Century Stare Decisis and a Weaker View of Constitutional Precedents   
Any meaningful exposition of the current state of stare decisis must necessarily include a 
discussion of its constitutional and statutory variations.  The Supreme Court is less hesitant to 
overrule past precedent in cases involving a constitutional question because of the importance 
placed upon proper interpretation of the Constitution.124  Conversely, the Court is more hesitant to 
overrule precedent in cases involving statutory construction.125  If a court incorrectly divines 
legislative construction, Congress may simply legislate around the decision.126  If the Court 
incorrectly decides a constitutional issue, the non-judicial mechanism by which to undo the 
decision—amending the Constitution—is an arduous and seldom-used process.127  Therefore, 
when convinced of a previous error in a matter of Constitutional interpretation, the Court “has 
never felt constrained to follow precedent.”128 
That the strength of precedent is determined by the type of matter before the Court is a 
relatively modern concept which dates back to at least the 1930s.  Justice Brandeis’s dissent in 
Burnet v. Colorado Oil & Gas Company codified this concept.129  Burnet questioned whether to 
adhere to or overrule Gillespie v. Oklahoma,130  which invalidated a state tax provision as an 
infringement upon interstate commerce.131  In an oft-quoted passage, Brandeis announced that 
 
124 See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Stare decisis is not, 
like the rule of res judicata, a universal, inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis, though one tending to 
consistency and uniformity of decision, is not inflexible.”).  
125 Lawrence C. Marshall, Let Congress Do It: The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. 
REV. 177, 181 (1989). 
126 See Burnet, 285 U.S. at 406.  
127 See id.  
128 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944).   
129 285 U.S. 393 (1932).  
130 257 U.S. 501 (1922).  
131 Id. at 506.  
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“[s]tare decisis is not . . . an inexorable command.”132  Though in an immediately preceding portion 
Brandeis remarked that in most cases it was of greater importance that the law “be settled than it 
be settled right,” Brandeis later explained that, in matters of Constitutional concern, where 
legislative correction is “practically impossible,” the Supreme Court “has often overruled its earlier 
decisions.”133  Twelve years later—and after the Court’s renunciation of Lochner v. New York134—
the Supreme Court lent support to Brandeis’s contention regarding precedential departure when, 
in Smith v. Allwright, the Court struck down a Texas voting requirement which barred African-
Americans from voting in primaries, thus overturning its own precedent in Grovey v. Townsend.135  
Exclaiming that “when convinced of former error, this Court has never felt constrained to follow 
precedent,” the Court overruled a prior case because of the “erroneous . . . application of a 
Constitutional principle.”136  Commentators contend that Allwright stands as the turning point in 
delineating this more flexible iteration of the doctrine in constitutional matters, deferring 
exclusively to Brandeis’s dissent which itself was of “questionable historical pedigree.”137  This 
differential standard continues to play an active role in the modern Court’s stare decisis 
framework.138  
The Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts addressed issues of constitutional interpretation 
with far more frequency than did their predecessors in the century prior.139  While Brandeis’s 
 
132 Burnet, 285 U.S. at 405 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
133 Id. at 406.  Brandeis also offered further support for a flexible stare decisis standard by explaining that in 
overturning precedent, “[t]he Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing 
that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function.  Id. 
at 407–08.  Brandeis cited a myriad of cases in two footnotes in support of the proposition that the Court had always 
been willing to overturn precedent when convinced of constitutional error.  See id. at 407 nn.2, 4.  
134 See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
135 Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).  
136 Id. at 664–65. 
137 Lee, supra note 100, at 727.   
138 See, e.g., Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2478 (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 
U.S. 808, 828 (1991); Burnet, 285 U.S. at 407).  
139 Lee, supra note 100, at 649–50. 
21 
 
“inexorable command” quote is now enshrined in a large number of decisions, only six came in 
the sixty years between Burnet and Casey.140  This shows the frequency with which the Rehnquist 
and Roberts Courts, particularly, have taken up challenged constitutional precedents.141  This 
relaxed standard, as forged by more recent Courts, is not without its detractors.  Some argue that 
“sliding scale” stare decisis is a product of the twentieth century, and completely at odds with the 
legal notions of the doctrine during the early years of the Marshall and Taney Courts.142  “If the 
Rehnquist Court is bent on abandoning a constitutional decision, it may do so with little more than 
a citation to [Burnet and Allwright] and their self-fulfilling notion of an accepted practice.”143   
Other members of the Court embraced the weakened constitutional stare decisis.  Justice 
Douglas preferred the tenuous nature of constitutional stare decisis, writing that “above all 
else . . . it is the Constitution which [we] swore to support and defend, not the gloss which [our] 
predecessors may have put on it.”144  But as it pertains to the ease with which the Court could 
overturn its own precedent, Justice Scalia likewise complained that “the doctrine of stare decisis 
has appreciably eroded” in more recent times.145  Notwithstanding the critiques of its membership, 
the Court continues to purportedly apply a system of weakened stare decisis to constitutional 
matters.146  The uptick in constitutional issues addressed by the Court brings with it a necessary 
 
140 See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 266 (1986); Payne, 501 U.S. at 828; Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 92 
(1938);  Comm'r v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632, 676 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Gwin, White & Prince, 
Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 454 (1939) (Black, J., dissenting).  
141 Lee, supra note 100, at 728.  
142 Id.  
143 Id.  
144 William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 743 (1949). 
145 Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in 
Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in 18 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 79, 87 (Grethe B. Peterson 
ed., 1997). 
146 Despite the Supreme Court’s purported likelihood to depart from precedent in constitutional decisions, empirical 
evidence contradicts that notion. A comprehensive evaluation found that the extent to which a challenged precedent 
implicates a constitutional issue plays only a marginal role in the Court’s decision to overturn or affirm it.  See Lee 
Epstein, William M. Landes & Adam Liptak, The Decision to Depart (or Not) from Constitutional Precedent: An 
Empirical Study of the Roberts Court, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1115, 1117 (2015).  Upon review of the 558 precedents 
attacked in Supreme Court cases between 1986–2013, 296 were constitutional law decisions and 262 were not.  Out 
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increase in stare decisis analysis.147  But with Justices believing constitutional decisions permit 
less precedential deference, the precise factors used in that analysis become all the more critical to 
a stable determination of not only what the law is, but whether it will continue to be what it is.  
IV. CURRENT STARE DECISIS DOCTRINE 
What are the conditions required for the Court to engage in comprehensive and meaningful 
stare decisis analysis before overturning precedent?  If stare decisis is tantamount to judicial 
calculus, how does a justice show her work?148  Whether the Court requires a less-than-tangible 
“special justification,” or objectively analyzes a list of codified and agreed-upon factors may 
determine the extent to which a challenged precedent’s reasoning may be more or less likely to 
factor in.  Fairly recent cases which delineate and expose the current state of stare decisis reinforce 
the open and unstable status of the doctrine.  Understanding the interplay between these factors 
helps better explain the present status and functionality of the doctrine.    
A. Special Justification 
As the Court moved through the Rehnquist era where more cases challenged precedent, the 
Court began to settle upon a more codified framework for when to overturn prior decisions.149  
 
of the total number, only twenty-two cases were expressly overturned.  Yet of these twenty-two, fourteen were 
constitutional precedents and nine were not.  This statistical difference is relatively insignificant.  See id. at 1140–41. 
147 Lee, supra note 100, at 649–650; see also Daniel Charles (DC) V. Wolf, David R. Fine, Robert B. Mitchell, A 
Janus-faced Standard? Chief Justice Roberts’s Approach to Stare Decisis at the Threshold of a Post-Justice Kennedy 
Supreme Court, K&L GATES (July 17, 2018), http://www.klgates.com/a-ijanusi-faced-standard-chief-justice-robertss-
approach-to-istare-decisisi-at-the-threshold-of-a-post-justice-kennedy-supreme-court-07-17-2018/ (noting that 
Roberts’s seemingly disparate treatment of stare decisis in recent decisions “suggest[s] that the extent to which 
Congress has the power to fix a precedent he disagrees with is a key factor for him in deciding how much to defer to 
the Court’s prior decisions”) (last visited Feb. 14, 2019). 
148 In Janus, Justice Alito employs the phrase “stare decisis calculus.”  Id. at 2481.  The phrase was only ever used in 
one other Supreme Court opinion: Justice Stevens’ dissent in Citizens United.  See 558 U.S. at 409 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting.).  In light of the difficulty with which the Court has grappled with its own view of the doctrine, the term 
“calculus” seems an apt description of the exercise.  
149 See Emery G. Lee III, Overruling Rhetoric: The Court's New Approach to Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases, 
33 U. TOL. L. REV. 581, 582.  Professor Lee argues that the move toward a more rigid version of stare decisis by the 
Rehnquist Court marks a “break with the Court’s historical approach” whereby the Court need only be convinced of 
prior error to overrule a constitutional precedent. Id.  (internal quotations and citations omitted).  
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Some commenters theorize that the Rehnquist Court may have begun to adopt a more cohesive 
stare decisis framework as a natural response to support the Court’s legitimacy in light of the 
appointment of five seemingly-conservative justices by Presidents Reagan and Bush in a relatively 
short period in the 1980s and early 1990s.150  Regardless of intention, the Court drifted toward a 
more codified stare decisis framework during this time.  This codification provided that overruling 
precedent required more than disagreement with the prior ruling, but also some additional, “special 
justification.”151  Noting that “adherence to precedent is not rigidly required in constitutional 
cases,” Justice O’Connor explained that “any departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands 
special justification.”152  
Five years later, Justice Kennedy set forth a series of factors to consider when deciding 
whether such special justification exists.153  In discussing the importance of the stare decisis 
doctrine, Kennedy explained that “stare decisis is a basic self-governing principle within the 
Judicial Branch, which is entrusted with the sensitive and difficult task of fashioning and 
preserving a jurisprudential system that is not based upon an arbitrary discretion.”154  First, 
Kennedy explained that developments in the law since the writing of the challenged decision could 
weigh against retaining that precedent.155  Next, the Court could consider whether the challenged 
rule had demonstrated some unworkability.156  Lastly, whether the past precedent had befallen 
 
150 Id. at 583.  
151 Id. at 582.  This special justification language was first used by Justice O’Connor in Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 
203 (1984), which declined to overturn Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981).   
152 See Rumsey, 467 U.S. at 212 (noting that because the petitioner had not offered any such justification sufficient to 
overturn Bullington, the Court declined to do so). 
153 See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).  
154 Id. at 172 (internal quotations omitted).  
155 Id. at 173.  “Where such changes [(either by Congress or through subsequent actions by the courts)] have removed 
or weakened the factual underpinnings from the prior decision, or where the later law has rendered the decision 
irreconcilable with competing legal doctrines, the court has not hesitated to overrule an earlier decision.”  Id.  (internal 
citations omitted).  
156 Id. at 173–74.  A decision is unworkable if it poses a “detriment to coherence and consistency in the law, either 
because of inherent confusion created by an unworkable decision…or because the decision poses a direct obstacle to 
the realization of important objectives embodied in other laws . . . .”  Id. at 173. 
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some level of publicly-perceived inconsistency with a “prevailing sense of justice” could weigh in 
favor of overturning a prior decision.157  These three factors in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union 
lay the groundwork for Justice Kennedy’s hallmark elucidation of stare decisis, authored just three 
years later.  
B. Payne v. Tennessee 
The buildup to the framework outlined in Casey was immediately preceded by what some 
consider a less-than-thorough approach to stare decisis in Payne v. Tennessee, decided just one 
term before Casey in 1991.158  Payne overturned the Supreme Court’s precedents in Booth v. 
Maryland and South Carolina v. Gathers, both of which held that the Eighth Amendment 
precludes a jury’s consideration of victim impact statements in the sentencing phase of capital 
trials.159  Booth was decided only four years before the Court overturned it in Payne, with 
Gathers’ upholding of the Booth precedent in the intervening period.  As noted by Justice 
Marshall in his scathing dissent, the Court only overturned Booth and Gathers after a 
consequential change in Court personnel.160  In his dissent, Marshall pointedly decried the Court’s 
novel and cavalier approach to stare decisis, noting that the decision whether to overturn Booth 
and Gathers was not a function of which parties in those cases “had the better of the argument.”161  
Taking issue with the majority’s notion that a precedent is somehow weaker if decided by a 
narrow margin in the face of “spirited dissents,” Marshall lamented that the Court leaves open the 
possibility that any liberty hitherto protected by the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment 
 
157 Id. at 174–75.  “[A] precedent becomes more vulnerable as it becomes outdated and after being ‘tested by 
experience, has been found inconsistent with…the social welfare.’”  Id. at 174 (internal citations omitted).   
158 See Tom Hardy, Has Mighty Casey Struck Out?: Societal Reliance and the Supreme Court's Modern Stare Decisis 
Analysis, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 591, 596 (2007). 
159 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).  
160 See id. at 844 (Marshal, J., dissenting) (“Neither the law nor the facts supporting Booth and Gathers underwent any 
change in the last four years.  Only the personnel of this Court did.”).  
161 Id. at 848 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
25 
 
could be “open for reexamination.”162  Concerned with what this meant for judicial legitimacy, 
Marshall contended that an “impoverished conception of stare decisis cannot possibly be 
reconciled with the values that inform the proper judicial function. . . . [F]idelity to precedent is 
part and parcel of a conception of ‘the judiciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned 
judgments.’”163 
Marshall’s dissent underscores the continued struggles to balance judicial legitimacy 
within a proper stare decisis framework.  He announced his retirement from the Supreme Court 
just one day after the decision in Payne.164  The conservative Justice Thomas replaced Marshall, 
and the Court granted certiorari in Casey the following January.165 
C. The Casey Factors 
Conservative commentators fully expected the Court, with conservative Thomas on and 
liberal Marshall out, to overturn Roe v. Wade.166  Instead of bringing Justice Marshall’s concerns 
about debilitated stare decisis to fruition with yet another change in the Court’s personnel ushering 
in a change in personal liberties, the joint opinion in Casey provided one of the strongest 
delineations of stare decisis ever announced.167  Casey, for this reason, is considered the high water 
mark of stare decisis,168 with many articles utilizing the Casey framework in thorough 
examinations of the doctrine.169  This Comment proceeds no differently.   
 
162 Id. at 851 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
163 Id. at 852 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
164James J. Kilpatrick, When Marshall Disrobed His Colleagues, BALT. SUN (July 3, 1991), 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1991-07-03/news/1991184073_1_payne-v-justice-marshall-thurgood-marshall. 
165 502 U.S. 1056, 1057 (1992). 
166 See Lee III, supra note 149, at 604.  
167 See Hardy, supra note 158.  
168 See Colin Starger, The Dialectic of Stare Decisis Doctrine, in PRECEDENT IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
19, 39 (C. J. Peters, ed., 2013) https://www.springer.com/cda/content/document/cda_downloaddocument/ 
9789400779501-c2.pdf?SGWID=0-0-45-1491975-p176334460. 
169 See, e.g., Healy, supra note 25, at 1210–18; Lee III, supra note 166, at 603–611.  
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Casey retained the central holding of Roe, opting to reaffirm “a woman's right to choose to 
have an abortion before fetal viability . . . [because] the State[’s] . . . previability interests are not 
strong enough to support an abortion prohibition . . . .”170  Casey serves as the apex of strong stare 
decisis doctrine because of the depth and importance of its treatment of the doctrine.  There, the 
Court announced that the arguments against Roe were outweighed by the “explication of individual 
liberty . . . combined with the force of stare decisis.”171  While the opinion admits that, to some of 
the justices, “abortion [is] offensive to our most basic principles of morality,” the stare decisis 
considerations outlined in the plurality opinion supported the retention of Roe’s central holding.172  
Casey set out four specific criteria which the Court should consider when taking up the question 
of whether or overrule precedent.173  This analysis, which spans fifteen pages, is grounded in 
“pragmatic and prudential concerns.”174  By accentuating the importance of the doctrine, the 
opinion emphasizes judicial legitimacy, the overriding and pervasive justification for strong 
precedential reliance.175  
1.  Reliance 
Of the four “practical and pragmatic considerations” set forth by the Casey joint opinion, 
three address whether the challenged precedent “can be reconciled with the continuity required by 
 
170 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 843 (1992).   
171 See id. at 853.  See also id. at 861 (“[T]he stronger argument is for affirming Roe’s central holding, with whatever 
degree of personal reluctance any of us may have, not for overruling it.”). Nevertheless, some commentators contend 
that Casey supports a knowingly false legal conception.  See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional 
Opinion of All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995, 1028 (2003) (asserting that some of the Justices who reaffirmed 
Roe “apparently did so in knowing violation of both law and personal conscience.”); Lee J. Strang, An Originalist 
Theory of Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, 36 N.M. L. REV. 419, 422 
(2006) (“[D]espite admitted reservations about whether Roe correctly interpreted the Constitution, the Casey plurality 
decision followed Roe's result.”). 
172 Casey, 505 U.S. at 850.   
173 Id. at 854–55.  
174 Id. at 854. 
175 See id. at 864 (quoting Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 636 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“A basic 
change in the law upon a ground no firmer than a change in our membership invites the popular misconception that 
this institution is little different from the two political branches of the Government. No misconception could do more 
lasting injury to this Court and to the system of law which it is our abiding mission to serve.”). 
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the rule of law.”176  The most outward-looking factor the Court considers is whether the challenged 
precedent has engendered the type of reliance “that would lend a special hardship to the 
consequences of overruling.”177  Here, reliance means not just commercial reliance as had been 
previously examined,178 but also the social reliance implicit in the predictability of a particular rule 
of law continuing to govern.179  Consideration of societal reliance highlights important stare decisis 
justifications like predictability and fairness, and better permits a reviewing Court to determine 
which cases it should not overrule.180  Reliance interests would weigh against overruling precedent 
when to do so would “contradict what Americans have been told the Constitution requires.”181  
Casey noted that, in the time since Roe, many Americans had “ordered their thinking” 
around the availability of abortion, and that “the ability of women to participate equally in the 
economic and social life of the Nation” produced strong social reliance on the decision.182  While 
reliance on the challenged precedent was not easily quantified, the costs of overruling it could not 
be completely cast aside.183  Some have understood societal reliance—and the Casey stare decisis 
framework in general—as an understandable response to combat the perception of an overtly 
political Supreme Court.184  Others have decried what they perceive as the Court’s dereliction of 
its duty to faithfully interpret the Constitution itself, and that deference to societal expectations 
prevents the Court from carrying out its role of saying “what the law is.”185  Despite some scholarly 
 
176 Lee III, supra note 149, at 604–05. 
177 Casey, 505 U.S. at 854. 
178 See, e.g., Payne, 501 U.S. at 828 (“Considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving 
property and contract rights, where reliance interests are involved.”). 
179 See Lee III, supra note 149, at 618 
180 Healy, supra note 25, at 1214.  
181 Lee III, supra note 149, at 618.  
182 Casey, 505 U.S. at 856.  
183 Id.  
184 Lee III, supra note 149, at 619. 
185 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect 
of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1539 (2000). But see, Hillel Y. Levin, A Reliance Approach To Precedent, 
47 GA. L. REV. 1035, 1054–1055 (arguing that societal reliance should have the most dominant precedential effect). 
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criticism, the importance of societal reliance remains a key component of current stare decisis 
doctrine.186  
2. Workability 
The Court may overturn itself if a precedent’s rule is “intolerable simply in defying 
practical workability.”187  The Casey majority did not expand on this factor, most likely because 
other cases offer a sufficient definition.188  For example, the challenged legal rule in Garcia  v. San 
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority189 proved unworkable because, in the nine years since its 
inception in National League of Cities v. Usery,190 courts were unable to distinguish between 
traditional and non-traditional governmental functions consistently.191  Similarly, Swift & Co. v. 
Wickham192 discarded a three-year-old rule in Kesler v. Department of Public Safety193 because 
judges failed to apply it consistently.194   
The Casey Court found that Roe had not become unworkable because it merely provides a 
“simple limitation beyond which a state law is unenforceable.”195  Even though Casey abandoned 
Roe’s trimester framework, a fairly substantial portion of the precedent, the mere need for judicial 
review and enforcement of a precedent does not by itself negatively implicate its workability.196  
Workability continued to play a role in whether to overturn precedent in a later case.  In Pearson 
 
186 Chief Justice Rehnquist, himself a Casey dissenter, considered societal reliance an important consideration which 
weighed in favor of retaining the core ruling of Miranda.  See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (noting 
that “Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of 
our national culture.”).  Id. at 443.   
187 Casey, 505 U.S. at 854.  
188 See Healy, supra note 25, at 1211.  
189 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
190 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
191 See Healy, supra note 25, at 1211. 
192 382 U.S. 111, 126–29 (1965). 
193 369 U.S. 153 (1962). 
194 Healy, supra note 25, at 1212 
195 Casey, 505 U.S. at 855.  
196 See id.  
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v. Callahan,197 the Court reversed a procedural requirement announced just eight years earlier in 
Saucier v. Katz,198 which required qualified immunity inquiries to proceed in a specified order 
because “experience had pointed up the precedent’s shortcomings.”199   
3.  Remnant of Abandoned Doctrine 
When a precedent has eroded to the point where its “doctrinal footings [are] weaker than 
they were” at the time of the original decision, such that it remains an outlier amongst more recent 
jurisprudence, the precedent is more easily overturned.200  This factor was discussed briefly in 
Patterson,201 but most noticeably employed in another politically-charged case decided some 
eleven years after Casey: Lawrence v. Texas.202  The underpinnings of Bowers v. Hardwick203 had 
weakened in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Romer v. Evans,204 depriving the former of 
the force on which its reasoning principally relied.205  The precedent challenged in Casey was 
upheld no less than three times by the Supreme Court in the first thirteen years following the initial 
decision.206  If a legal principle evolves to the point where a challenged precedent has little 
remaining effective force, it is more easily overruled.  Roe rested upon a series of principled and 
uneroded cases which, Casey argued, kept the doctrine on firm footing.207  Roe and the substantive 
due process progeny it embodies was “not a series of isolated points, but mark[s] a rational 
 
197 555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
198 533 U.S. 194 (2001).  
199 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 233.  
200 Casey, 505 U.S. at 857. 
201 491 U.S. 164 (1989). 
202 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
203 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding constitutionality of sodomy laws).   
204 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down a Colorado constitutional amendment preventing state actors 
from protecting homosexuals from discrimination).  
205 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574.  
206 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 858 (citing Akron v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, (1983) and 
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)).  
207 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 857 (noting that Roe evolves form liberty principles first exemplified in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and from cases preventing government infringement of bodily integrity as 
explained in Cruzan v.Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)).  
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continuum.”208  Even if Roe’s central holding was wrong, the Court contended, its continued 
application would not diminish the liberty upon which it is based, but merely alter the extent of 
the state’s pre-viability interest.209  The clear implication is that the erroneousness of a past 
decision—even one as controversial as a right to an abortion—was not, without more, a sufficient 
justification to overrule precedent. 
Whether stare decisis should consider the effect of a precedent as part of an abandoned 
doctrine inquiry has provoked some criticism.  Some claim that a Court can simply overrule a case 
incrementally by weakening its effect in one case, and then in a subsequent one, overrule it 
altogether because of the erosion of the precedent at issue.210  Others remark that notable doctrines 
abandoned throughout recent history have required more cases to chip away at the foundation.211  
No matter the history of abandoned precedent, more recently-reversed precedents rely on doctrines 
abandoned in a far shorter length of time.212 
4.  Changed Facts or Circumstances 
When facts change or are viewed so differently “as to have robbed the old rule of significant 
application or justification,” a court may overrule precedent.213  This consideration addresses 
societal understanding of the issue in question.  Thus, Casey examined whether, in the two decades 
 
208 Casey, 505 U.S. at 858 (internal citations omitted).  
209 Id. 
210 See Paulsen, supra note 185, at 1557. 
211 See Healy, supra note 25,  at 1213–14 (recalling that Plessy’s doctrine was abandoned by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 
347 U.S. 483, 495–96 (1954) (banning segregation in public schools); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350, 353 
(1962) (per curiam) (banning segregation in restaurants); and Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707, 717 (M.D. Ala. 
1956), aff'd mem., 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (banning segregation on public busses)).  
212 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 377–78 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).  In Citizens United, 
because the challenged precedent, McConnell v. FEC, had come under criticism just three years earlier in FEC v. 
Wisconsin Right to Life, the fact that the challenged precedent continued to be a point of contention among the Justices 
“undermine[s] the precedent's ability to contribute to the stable and orderly development of the law.”  Id. at 380.  This 
same trend appeared in Janus, where the Court relied heavily on is decisions in Knox v. SEIU from 2012 and Harris 
v. Quinn from 2014 to explain why the legal underpinnings of Abood sufficiently weakened its doctrinal foundations.  
See Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2483 (2018).  
213 Casey, 505 U.S. at 855.  
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since Roe, the factual premises had transformed past the point of Roe’s usefulness and 
relevancy.214  For example, Brown v. Board of Education reconsidered the separate-but-equal 
doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson and found a sufficient change in facts to warrant overturning 
because the “badge of inferiority” with which people of color were stamped at the time of Plessy 
no longer governed societal understanding.215  Likewise, Casey wrote that Lochner had also been 
undermined by changed premises, explaining that the Great Depression had proved the failure of 
laissez faire economics which Lochner—according to the plurality opinion in Casey—
embodied.216  Casey found no such erosion of relied-upon factual assumptions which undercut 
Roe’s central holding.217  While advances in medical technology made abortions safer and brought 
about fetal viability earlier than it had been in 1973, those changed facts did not weaken the 
fundamental right, but instead only impacted the judicial solution addressing the competing 
interests at stake.218 
Casey’s factors remain the most comprehensive codification of the stare decisis doctrine.219   
Yet, the Court’s recent emphasis on the quality of a challenged precedent’s reasoning provides a 
new set of challenges and concerns because the Court’s ability to circumvent Casey could also 
mean circumventing stare decisis.   
V.  THE REASONING FACTOR 
 
214 Id.  
215 Id. at 863.  
216 Id. at 861–62.  But see id. at 961 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“The Lochner Court did not base its rule upon the 
policy judgment that an unregulated market was fundamental to a stable economy; it simply believed, erroneously, 
that ‘liberty’ under the Due Process Clause protected the ‘right to make a contract.’”).  
217 Id. at 864.   
218 Casey, 505 U.S. at 860.  While retaining Roe’s central holding, Casey discarded Roe’s trimester framework, opting 
instead for an undue burden test, in part as a result of how “time [had] overtaken some of Roe’s factual assumptions.” 
Id. 
219 See Starger, supra note 168.  
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The extent to which a challenged precedent’s reasoning may weigh against its continued 
following dates back, as does the doctrine, to the Medieval era.220  Because medieval English 
judges in no way considered themselves bound by a previous decision, most made decisions 
regardless of how instructive a past case may have been.221  At times, mere disagreement with a 
prior decision served as sufficient justification to adopt a separate rule.222  The amount of deference 
a precedent received depended almost entirely upon whether a current judge agreed with the 
reasoning of a prior decision.223  Because they were not bound by precedent in a per se, formalistic 
sense, judges “stood above all precedent.”224  Later legal theorists expounded on the notion that 
reasoning plays a role in a precedent’s retention.225  Blackstone, himself a fervent supporter of 
strong stare decisis, contended that judges ought to neglect precedent only when a previous 
decision is “flatly absurd or unjust,” or “evidently contrary to reason.”226  The level of a decision’s 
wrongfulness plays a part in the modern standards of appellate review, where courts may reverse 
a lower court’s factual findings only if they are clearly erroneous.227  In light of the legal history 
of precedential reasoning and the way in which erroneousness factors into other facets of modern 
judicial calculus, consideration of a challenged precedent’s reasoning flows naturally from these 
other legal foundations.228    
 
220 See Healy, supra note 20, at 60–61.  
221 Id.  
222 See Carleton Kemp Allen, LAW IN THE MAKING (Legal Classics Library Special), 200 (1992) (noting that Chief 
Justice Bereford, in opting not to follow an earlier court’s decision, explained “That was a mistake. We will not do 
so”).  
223 See Healy, supra note 20, at 61 (“[I]f a previous decision was consistent with the judge's view of reason, it might 
be considered for its instructive value.  But if it conflicted with reason - in other words, if the judge disagreed with it 
- it could have no value.”). 
224 Id.  
225 See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *70.  
226 Healy, supra note 25, at 1182. 
227 Id. 
228 Id. at 1210, 1218 (asserting that courts utilize only a moderate presumption of precedential deference and thus, 
implicitly or otherwise, consider whether a challenged precedent is “egregiously wrong.”).   
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Tracing the evolution of the reasoning factor through the cases Janus cites for the 
proposition uncovers a thin line of support.  In Janus, Alito announced “[a]n important factor in 
determining whether a precedent should be overruled is the quality of its reasoning.”229  Janus 
cites Chief Justice Roberts’s Citizens United v. F.E.C. concurrence, as well as the majority opinion 
in Lawrence for the contention that the quality of a precedent’s reasoning serves a proper stare 
decisis function.230  Incidentally, Roberts’s Citizens United concurrence was devoted entirely to 
stare decisis in order to defend the majority from claims of judicial activism.231  Citizens United 
overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce’s ban on corporate political speech.232  The 
majority was right to overrule the challenged precedent, Roberts wrote, in part because Austin had 
proved to be a source of persistent judicial criticism.233  The government urged the Court to retain 
Austin upon two new compelling interests that the Court had failed to recognize and upon which 
the precedent was not based.  This proved most damning to Austin’s prospects for retention, as 
these implicit concessions “underscore[d] its weakness as a precedent of the Court.”234   
This treatment of stare decisis in Citizens United is not without its criticism.  Professors 
Silver and Kozlowski take issue with the stare decisis analysis in Citizens United, calling the 
relevant factors considered by Kennedy’s majority opinion and Roberts’ concurrence “relatively 
new,” “completely novel,” and “problematic.”235  Of particular concern is Kennedy’s and 
 
229 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2479, (citing Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 363–64; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577–78).  
230 Id. 
231 Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 599 (2011).  
232 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365.   
233 See id. at 380. “[T]he validity of Austin’s rationale—itself adopted over two spirited dissents—has proved to be 
the consistent subject of dispute among Members of this Court ever since.  The simple fact that one of our decisions 
remains controversial is, of course, insufficient to justify overruling it. But it does undermine the precedent's ability 
to contribute to the stable and orderly development of the law. In such circumstances, it is entirely appropriate for the 
Court–which in this case is squarely asked to reconsider Austin's validity for the first time–to address the matter with 
a greater willingness to consider new approaches capable of restoring our doctrine to sounder footing.” Id. (internal 
quotations and citations omitted).  
234 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 382–83.  
235 Derigan Silver & Dan V. Kozlowski, Preserving the Law's Coherence: Citizens United V. FEC and Stare Decisis, 
21 COMM. L. & POL'Y 39, 83–84 (2016).  
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Roberts’s reliance on the “soundness” of the challenged precedent.236  Their stare decisis analysis, 
adequately distilled, underlines this central point: soundness of a past decision becomes merely 
another way of agreeing with that prior decision and tends to rob precedent of its otherwise binding 
effect.237  Silver and Kozlowski also find fault with the notion that a precedent which has persisted 
amidst continued controversy and criticism is somehow less deserving of precedential weight.238  
Academic criticism notwithstanding, Janus’s reliance on Citizens United, while logically 
consistent, does not strengthen its stare decisis argument, but instead begs questions about the use 
of a precedent’s reasoning.   
The case made for considering a challenged precedent’s reasoning in Lawrence—also cited 
in Janus—is even more insubstantial.  Kennedy’s stare decisis analysis in Lawrence includes 
discussion of crucial reliance interests and how they weigh in favor of overturning the precedent 
in Bowers.239 The opinion then turns to the “rationale of Bowers” by quoting a passage of Stevens’s 
dissent in that case.240 The quoted portion of Stevens’s dissent makes two arguments which are 
directly applicable to the majority’s reasoning in Lawrence.241  First, traditionally perceived 
immorality is an insufficient basis upon which to uphold a law.242  Second, liberty, as protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment, includes the decisions of one’s intimate relationship, inclusive of 
married and unmarried persons.243  The Lawrence majority states that Stevens’s analysis should 
have been controlling then, and “should control here.  Bowers was not correct when it was decided, 
 
236 Id. at 83. 
237 Id.  
238 Id. at 83–84.  Roberts’s Citizens United concurrence reiterated the idea from Rehnquist in Payne that a majority 
opinion authored “over spirited dissents” was potentially more likely to fall. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 380 (Roberts, 
C.J., concurring).  
239 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577–78. 
240 Id. 
241 Id.  
242 Id. 
243 Id. at 578. 
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and it is not correct today.  It ought not to remain binding precedent.”244  While extolling the 
wisdom of Stevens’s dissent, the Lawrence majority does not examine Bowers for its 
wrongfulness, nor does the Court indicate that any wrongfulness of Bowers contributes to the 
reasons that weigh in favor of abandoning it.  Janus’s reliance on Lawrence’s insinuations of 
precedential wrongness, therefore, appears ill-conceived at best.  
Lawrence itself provides a less-than-perfect stare decisis showing because the Court 
overturned its own precedent but failed to engage in a thorough analysis of the Casey factors.245 
By failing to adhere to the Casey factors, the Court appears untethered to its own stare decisis 
jurisprudence at a time—while justifying the overruling of a constitutional precedent of obvious 
political importance—when consistency is inherently questioned.  The Lawrence majority may 
have reached the same decision about overturning Bowers had the Court methodically employed 
the Casey factors in its analysis.246  Yet, because it did not, the Court left itself open to claims of 
politicization and questions about its legitimacy.247  Still, others contend that Lawrence’s stare 
decisis analysis satisfied objective concerns by properly showing that the majority’s problems with 
the challenged precedent, Bowers, went well beyond “an overriding conviction of past error.”248  
 The reasoning language used by Alito in Janus—from Citizens United and Lawrence—
borrows stare decisis dicta from two other cases, Allwright and Payne, which altered constitutional 
precedent and helped shape stare decisis doctrine.249  In Allwright, Justice Reed concluded by 
noting that “when convinced of former error, this Court has never felt constrained to follow 
 
244 Id. at 577–78. 
245 Julie E. Payne, Abundant Dulcibus Vitiis, Justice Kennedy: In Lawrence v. Texas, an Eloquent and Overdue 
Vindication of Civil Rights Inadvertently Reveals What Is Wrong with the Way the Rehnquist Court Discusses Stare 
Decisis, 78 TUL. L. REV. 969, 1007 (2004). 
246 Id. at 973.  
247 Id.  
248 Kelly Parker, Of Sleeping Dogs and Silent Love: Stare Decisis and Lawrence v. Texas, 41 IDAHO L. REV. 117, 203 
(2004). 
249 See Lee, supra note 100, at 727; see also Part IV-B, infra.  
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precedent.”250  Payne went further, linking the reasoning factor with the workability factor as 
proper justification to overturn precedent.251  Despite the Court’s justifications of its treatment of 
precedent, empirical data suggests that the Roberts’s Court most reliably endorses three factors in 
practice: reliance, workability, and the quality of the challenged precedent’s reasoning.252  This 
same analysis also discovered a correlation between the frequency with which a brief before the 
Court demands that a precedent be overturned and the likelihood that precedent is in fact 
overturned.253  For example, by the end of the Court’s 2015 term, of the seventy-seven precedents 
challenged in briefs before the Roberts’s Court, only five cases had been attacked more frequently 
than Abood.254    
The primary concern with Janus’s view of stare decisis comes from the uneasiness implicit 
in the depth of its review of the challenged precedent’s reasoning.  Janus takes the poorly-reasoned 
consideration too far, bringing its review of Abood dangerously close to simply re-deciding the 
forty-one-year-old case on the merits.255  In so doing, Alito dilutes the potency of the doctrine and 
ignores the importance of the justifications it supports.  Identifying this dilemma does not, on its 
own, bring forth a solution.  But the depth of the problem should be thoroughly vetted and 
understood before one posits a solution.   
 
250 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944); see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (quoting 
Smith v. Allwright).  
251 See Payne, 501 U.S. at 827 (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944)) (“When governing decisions 
are unworkable or are badly reasoned, ‘this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent.’”). Arguably, better 
support exists for the contention that the quality of a precedent’s reasoning somehow plays a role in whether or not to 
retain it. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638–42 (1943) (offering a thorough refutation of 
the three-year-old opinion it overruled). 
252 Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Adam Liptak, The Decision To Depart (Or Not) From Constitutional Precedent: 
An Empirical Study of the Roberts Court, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1115, 1118 (2008).  
253 Id. at 1129–30.   
254 Id. at 1148–50.  Of course, the frequency with which litigants cited Abood in Supreme Court briefs does not 
necessarily mean that this was the reason the Court was more likely to overrule it.  Litigants were likely well aware 
of the Court’s inclinations regarding Abood, particularly in light of Knox, Harris, and Friedrichs. 
255 Janus’s comprehensive review of Abood goes far beyond how Citizens United addressed Austin, or the cursory 
review Lawrence paid to Bowers.  
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Weakened stare decisis means less support for the justifications underlying the doctrine.256  
Of the reasons advanced for its continued vitality, the promotion of certainty in the law is perhaps 
the most frequently cited.257  Stare decisis also impacts the perceived equality of the judicial 
system—one of the most deeply-entrenched notions of American democratic society—by helping 
to ensure that cases and controversies receive the same treatment.258  Requiring adherence to 
precedent also helps constrain judicial choice and, in so doing, helps foster impartiality.259  
Impartiality, or at least the perception of it, is perhaps the most essential value served by stare 
decisis.260  Faith in the entire system depends on the public believing that a judge’s personal 
predilections do not factor into the equation.261  This is undoubtedly an unrealistic—if not also 
unascertainable—expectation, and the normative proposal that follows attempts to account for that 
reality, rather than that ideal.  
A diminished conception of stare decisis would bring about less-predictable results in 
matters that would have a profound impact on a variety of weighty constitutional issues.  Abrupt 
changes to liberties codified through cases like Casey, Lawrence, and Obergefell v. Hodges 
demonstrate the extent to which a sudden change-of-mind by the Supreme Court would alter the 
daily lives of millions.262  Similarly, sudden changes to politically consequential doctrines from 
 
256 See, e.g., Payne, 502 U.S. at 827 (“[Stare decisis] promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent 
development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived 
integrity of the judicial process.”).  
257 See Healy, supra note 20, at 108. This may explain in part the pervasiveness with which the court addresses reliance 
interests.  
258 See id. (“From the Declaration of Independence’s claim that ‘all men are created equal’ to the Fourteenth 
Amendment's guarantee of ‘equal protection of the laws,’ our democracy has displayed a deep commitment to the 
principle of equal treatment. By adhering strictly to their own precedents, the courts help to strengthen that 
commitment.”).  
259 See id. at 109. 
260 See Silver & Kozlowski, supra note 235, at 83 (“[A] major component of adherence to the Court’s decision is the 
public’s belief that opinions are based on legal reasoning rather than policy preferences.”).  
261 See generally Payne, supra note 5, at 1008. 
262 Justice Kennedy, by siding with the majority in Janus and endorsing a view of precedent that focuses on its 
reasoning, may have “unwittingly . . . crafted the perfect weapon for activist judges” who would undue his legacy 
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cases like Citizens United, Shelby County v. Holder, and Janus could sharply re-align the nation’s 
political trajectory.263  If the public’s faith in the rule of law depends, in part, upon the stability 
and consistency that stare decisis seeks to provide, any lesser version of the doctrine necessarily 
risks less faith in the Supreme Court.      
VI. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD CLARIFY THE POORLY-REASONED STANDARD 
Stare decisis stresses the importance of certainty, yet the poorly-reasoned factor undercuts 
that certainty altogether.  The stare decisis tension between Casey and Janus means a higher level 
of hesitation about how a challenged precedent will be examined, and ultimately whether it will 
be overturned.  Janus accentuates the trend of the Roberts’s Court, which makes clear that the 
quality of a precedent’s reasoning continues to play a role in the Court’s decisions which implicate 
stare decisis.  The question is not whether a precedent’s reasoning should be analyzed, but how it 
can and should be analyzed.  This Section will offer three possible solutions for the poorly-
reasoned factor, weighing the potential benefits and drawbacks of each.  Ultimately, only one 
remedy allows precedential consideration to supplement more traditional stare decisis 
considerations while simultaneously constraining its ability to dominate the overall analysis.  
Clarifying the reasoning factor’s functionality and confining its use helps foster consistency while 
preserving the justifications for the stare decisis doctrine, vitally important to the survival of the 
public perception of judicial objectivity and faith in the rule of law.  
A.  Poor Solutions for the Poorly-Reasoned Factor 
 
which is “as fragile as it is immense.”  Jonathan Turley, Kennedy's Towering, Teetering Legacy, WASH. POST B05 
(July 1, 2018).   
263 Some commenters note that the recent focus on the reasoning of a past decision is a concept pushed by the Court’s 
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One possible answer to the question of whether the Court’s stare decisis framework should 
include a challenged precedent’s reasoning is to just exclude it from entering the equation 
altogether.  This would minimize the possibility of a justice’s policy preferences influencing a 
decision and guard against the perception of judicial subjectivity.  It would also comport with the 
views of Justice Kagan’s Janus dissent,264 as well as Justice Marshall’s dissent in Payne.265  
Because legal scholars have also warned about overreliance on the poorly-reasoned factor, keeping 
it out entirely seems a logical response to those concerns.266  
This proposition is simply unrealistic.  From a practical standpoint, justices will always 
bring their preconceived notions, policy preferences, and personal beliefs to the particular set of 
issues each case presents.  The way some decisions link a precedent’s workability to the reasoning 
factor indicate a predisposition to rely on one’s own beliefs about the strength of a precedent in 
question.267  In an ideal legal reality where purely objective judicial decision-making is not just 
ascertainable, but also identifiable, the complete exclusion of a challenged precedent’s reasoning 
would certainly seem a benchmark worth striving.  Such an ideal legal reality, however, is 
unattainable.  Accordingly, forcing a Supreme Court justice to cordon off or disguise his or her 
 
264 See 138 S. Ct. at 2497 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The majority makes plain, in the first 33 pages of its decision, that 
it believes Abood was wrong. But even if that were true (which it is not), it is not enough.”). 
265 See 501 U.S. at 844 (“[T]he majority declares itself free to discard any principle of constitutional liberty which was 
recognized or reaffirmed over the dissenting votes of four Justices and with which five or more Justices now disagree.  
The implications of this radical new exception to the doctrine of stare decisis are staggering.”). 
266 See Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 716 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Who ignores [the doctrine of 
stare decisis] must give reasons . . . that go beyond mere demonstration that the overruled opinion was wrong 
(otherwise the doctrine would be no doctrine at all).”); Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2652 (2014) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) (“The special justifications needed to reverse an opinion must go beyond demonstrations (much less 
assertions) that it was wrong; that is the very point of stare decisis.”).  See also Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and 
Constitutional Structure, 112 NW. U.L. REV. 789, 794 (The principle that overrulings should require more than 
disagreement allows precedent to play the constraining, stabilizing role . . . . [J]udges should resist the urge to overrule 
decisions that they deem to be clearly erroneous or poorly reasoned, because such descriptions tend to be bound up 
with methodological tendencies that vary from judge to judge.”); Healy, supra note 25, at 1208 (“If courts are not 
bound, even presumptively, by decisions they disagree with, then precedent has no authority and courts are simply 
resolving cases on the merits.”).  
267 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (quoting Smith v. Allwright 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (“When 




own inherent predispositions is not transparent.  Clear expectations of the stare decisis doctrine 
better serve the public’s faith in the judicial system. 
At the other end of the spectrum, the counterpoint to complete exclusion altogether is to 
not only include the quality of a challenged precedent’s reasoning, but to offer that consideration 
controlling weight.  In short, if a majority of the Court feels the past precedent is poorly reasoned, 
then that alone could be sufficient justification to overturn past precedent.  After all, if a justice 
will always, consciously or otherwise, rely on his or her personal view of the merits of a prior 
decision, then why not permit that factor to control?268  
This too, for obvious reasons, misses the mark.  While it would undoubtedly trim down the 
necessary briefing, it would also permit blatant subjectivity to infect the stare decisis process.  
Because predictability and consistency support the rule of law, placing controlling reliance on the 
perceived rightness or wrongness of past precedent destroys any semblance of apolitical respect 
the Court may still have in these bitterly partisan times.  The Court should take strides to remove 
itself from day-to-day partisan acrimony and trumped-up political showdowns.269  Making obvious 
that “power, not reason” controls the Court’s decision-making, as Justice Marshall warned in 
Payne, would shake one of the most important institutions of American democracy.270  
B.  The Way Forward: Inclusion of a Precedent’s Reasoning with Limited Weight  
The soundness of a past precedent should be included in the Supreme Court stare decisis 
formulations, but its weight should be limited.  Including this factor serves as an acknowledgment 
 
268 But see Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861 (1992) (“[T]he stronger argument is for affirming Roe’s central holding, with 
whatever degree of personal reluctance any of us may have, not for overruling it.”).  
269 The integrity of the Court has been a purported goal of Chief Justice Roberts during his tenure. Some contend that 
his vote breaking with the conservative wing and retaining the Affordable Care Act in NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 
(2012) was an action geared more toward preserving the perception of an apolitical judiciary amidst intense political 
scrutiny. See Jan Crawford, Roberts Switched Views to Uphold Health Care Law, CBS NEWS (July 2, 2012), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/roberts-switched-views-to-uphold-health-care-law/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2018).  
270 See Payne, 501 U.S. at 844 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
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of the impossibility of completely sanitizing all personal inclinations from important decisions.  
Litigants should be on notice that the quality of a challenged precedent’s reasoning will be 
evaluated by the Court when bringing a challenge to a precedent.  Likewise, respondents arguing 
in favor of retaining the old doctrine should be on notice that they should be prepared to justify the 
precedent.271  By including the factor, the Court will naturally avoid the likelihood of an 
ideological dissent decrying the subversion of stare decisis.272  Transparency in the judicial process 
will help support belief in the Court and the rule of law.273 
Whether a precedent truly is poorly-reasoned should hinge on more objective criteria.  Such 
conditions may include the legitimate consistency of the challenged precedent with other similarly-
related decisions amidst the jurisprudence of the time.274  Additional, objective considerations 
could also include the extent to which a challenged precedent is based on non-analogous legal 
reasoning.275  For example, in Janus, one of Alito’s most convincing claims about Abood’s 
reasoning was how it misused Hanson and Street’s conclusions about private agency fee 
arrangements to justify them in the public sector.276  If Abood completely misapplied then-existing 
First Amendment precedent, poor reasoning to that degree would be more firmly grounded in 
 
271 See, e.g., Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2481–82 (“Not even the parties defending agency fees support the line that it has 
taken this Court over 40 years to draw.”); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 383–84 (noting that the arguments made for 
retaining the challenged precedent were not the same on which the precedent was based).  
272 In light of Rehnquist’s language in Payne, avoidance of “spirited dissents” seems a worthwhile endeavor before 
that issue develops into the next potential stare decisis consideration-to-be-included.  
273 See William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 754 (1949) (“The principle of full disclosure has 
as much place in government as it does in the market place. A judiciary that discloses what it is doing and why it does 
it will breed understanding.”). 
274 The most succinct way to illustrate this point is to liken it to the abuse-of-discretion standard of appellate review.  
An opinion can be poorly-reasoned—for the purposes of precedential reasoning inclusion in stare decisis 
formulations—if the then-existing operative law nearly required that the matter, in all likelihood, be decided one way, 
but it was decided another.  However, if the precedent is objectively poorly-reasoned, but that reasoning now runs 
afoul of other Casey factors—most plausibly remnant of an abandoned doctrine or changed facts or circumstances—
such that the original reasoning that should have controlled is itself no longer operable, the Casey factors should 
control.  To allow to decades-old reasoning to still control would be to subvert the evolution of related doctrine.  
275 See, e.g., Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2479–80 (noting that Abood was based on two cases which failed to adequately 
address the First Amendment issues at play because the union agreements in Hanson and Street dealt with private-
sector employment.).   
276 Id.  
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objective concerns.277  This focus on objective reasoning criteria generally accords with how some 
scholars envision the role of the reasoning factor in stare decisis framework.278  
Alito’s predispositions toward agency fees, and perhaps public employee unions in general, 
as shown in Knox and Harris, bring forth dangerous concerns about the Court’s over-politicization.  
That worry, while perhaps appropriately discomforting, does not on its own make Abood 
necessarily worthy of retaining.279 Including the reasoning factor in the Court’s stare decisis 
framework, while simultaneously limiting the role it can play, effectively guards against these 
overly-political concerns.  Whether Abood impinges upon the First Amendment to the extent 
characterized by the majority, or whether reliance interests as strong as the dissent argues should—
or even ought to—outweigh that impingement, would comprise part of a healthy debate on the 
existence of poorly-reasoned precedent.   
Though it should be considered, the Court should not afford the quality of the challenged 
precedent determinative weight.  As explained in Part IV, infra, stare decisis draws on a series of 
different considerations and weighs them together.  These considerations, ideally the four factors 
explained in Casey, should predominate the analysis because of their prevalence, persistence, and 
 
277 See generally Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 8 (“[W]hen 
a court says that a past decision is demonstrably erroneous, it is saying not only that it would have reached a different 
decision as an original matter, but also that the prior court went beyond the range of indeterminacy created by the 
relevant source of law….[T]he doctrine of stare decisis could take account of this difference.”).  Of course, reasonable 
Justices could differ as to whether a prior court even went beyond that “range of indeterminacy.”  Nevertheless, there 
remains a distinct difference between weighing the extent to which a past precedent strayed from its jurisprudential 
moorings and simply re-deciding a challenged precedent on the merits.  
278 See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 304 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Though upholdingthe 
challenged precedent earlier on purely stare decisis grounds, recent legal challenges increased Stevens’ inclination to 
overrule a decision that “can be properly characterized as ‘egregiously incorrect’”); see also Healy, supra note 25, at 
1209–10 (Courts in practice more closely follow the “moderate presumption” model of precedential deference, or the 
concept that “mere disagreement with an earlier decision is not enough to overrule . . . [but] the extent of disagreement 
with the earlier decision can be taken into account . . . . [O]ne of the special reasons that will justify the overruling of 
precedent is a conviction that the earlier decision was egregiously wrong.”). 
279 See Nelson, supra note 277, at 8 (“The doctrine of stare decisis would indeed be no doctrine at all if courts were 
free to overrule a past decision simply because they would have reached a different decision as an original matter.”).  
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objective focus.  Even if a precedent is objectively poorly reasoned, the Casey factors should still 
carry the calculus.   
The concerning dilemma with Janus is not its political outcome, but the ease with which a 
majority can choose different, and most alarmingly, unanticipated and enigmatic methods to arrive 
at the stare decisis result.  Because stare decisis is not a mathematic formulation, it is difficult to 
definitively recognize the box-ticking mechanics of a particular stare decisis decision.  In order to 
ensure that the Court has not given determinative weight to the reasoning factor, Supreme Court 
opinions that address comprehensive stare decisis concerns should proceed in a similar manner as 
one another.  For stare decisis to lean in favor of overruling an objectively poorly-reasoned 
precedent, the Court should find a plurality of the Casey factors skew heavily against it.  
A choose-your-own-adventure conception of the doctrine presents far too many risks.  
Adhering to a consistent framework strengthens the doctrine and allows for better judicial 
analysis.280  Whichever way the scales tip, the reasoning of a challenged precedent should not be 
the controlling stare decisis factor.  Other more traditional, and more ascertainably objective stare 
 
280 Several post-Payne articles urge a more consistent stare decisis framework and explain the detrimental effects of 
an inconsistent doctrine, notwithstanding the merits of a particular decision or the idealized stare decisis norms for 
which legal academics may advocate.  See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 145, 153–56 (2008) (explaining the inconsistencies in Justice Stevens’ stare decisis approaches);  
Payne, supra note 5, at 972–73 (failure of the Rehnquist Court to rigidly apply the Casey stare decisis framework in  
Lawrence risks the appearance of  politicization); Parker, supra note 248, at 196 (expressing concern with stare decisis 
variability in Lawrence and the inherent risk of subjectivity and inconsistency by deviating from it); John Wallace, 
Note, Stare Decisis and the Rehnquist Court: The Collision of Activism, Passivism and Politics in Casey, 42 BUFFALO 
L. REV. 187, 251 (1994) (decrying the failure “traditional” stare decisis considerations to overrule Roe in Casey);  
David L. Berland, Note, Stopping The Pendulum: Why Stare Decisis Should Constrain The Court From Further 
Modification Of The Search Incident To Arrest Exception, U. ILL. L. REV. 695 (Calling for greater stare decisis 
consistency in the wake of the Court’s decision in Arizona v. Gant); David Crump, Overruling Crawford V. 
Washington: Why And How, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 115, 155 (2012) (“[B]y departing from stare decisis without 
analyzing whether the departure could be justified under the Court's decisions authorizing it, Justice Scalia arguably 
engaged in reasoning that ought itself to be rejected.”).  But see, Kurt T. Lash, The Evolution Of Theory: The Cost Of 
Judicial Error: Stare Decisis And The Role Of Normative Theory, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2189, 2206 (2014) 
(arguing that “varying application of the doctrine of stare decisis is perfectly appropriate in a system that allows for 
the application of normative constitutional theory.”).  
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decisis factors, like the four in Casey, should predominate.281  The more consistent and 
comprehensive the stare decisis analysis, the heavier the lifting done by the Casey factors.  
C.  Anticipated Criticism 
 One might object that this change to the stare decisis framework permits a justice to 
include—or at the very least attempt to less-than-cleverly disguise—his or her views of 
constitutional provisions at best, or his or her policy preferences at worst, in vitally important and 
consequential constitutional decisions.  Some would argue that this poison the well, openly 
permitting a corruption of the process that stare decisis itself strives to prevent.  Few would argue 
that faith in the Supreme Court would be enhanced by discarding all notions of stare decisis 
altogether.  This attack presupposes that implicit judicial preferences can be definitively removed 
from the equation.  The solution proposed recognizes that they cannot and seeks to prevent judicial 
subjectivity from controlling stare decisis.  Tethering the poorly-reasoned factor to more objective 
considerations and providing it only limited weight keeps any bias as appropriately and efficiently 
cabined as possible.   
Some may also disapprove of the inclusion of this standard because, even if it limits the 
weight of the poorly-reasoned factor, any watering-down of stare decisis risks sharper ideological 
swings on an already polarized Supreme Court.  If established precedents are less likely to survive 
a definitive change in Court membership, such quick ideological changes would upset legitimate 
reliance interests and upend predictability, sullying the reputation of the Court.  Concerns about 
the extent to which Justice Kavanagh may provide a decisive vote for the conservative wing if 
engaged in assaults on topics such as substantive due process or equal protection jurisprudence 
 
281 This Comment’s normative proposal does not mean that utilization of this methodology would necessarily see 
Janus’s stare decisis analysis come out differently than it did.  Alito makes a compelling argument that Abood was 
objectively poorly-reasoned.  See supra note 275.  
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underscore the severity of these apprehensions.  These concerns, however, assume that, but for the 
stare decisis doctrine, the Court would not otherwise limit its interpretation of challenged 
precedents.  Indeed, the Court frequently limits its precedents without overtly overruling them.282  
And again, by constraining the use of precedential reasoning, the Court must still ground its stare 
decisis analysis in traditional and objective criteria.  This may not completely deter shifting 
jurisprudence resulting from a change in the Court’s membership, but a departure from precedent 
would still require justification over and above that personnel change.  This proposal adheres to 
that ideal.283 
VII. CONCLUSION 
A Supreme Court justice is not cleansed of all political inclinations or personal policy 
preferences upon her swearing in.  Indeed, a president selects nominees who will interpret the 
Constitution in a manner consistent with each respective administration’s stated aims.  Yet the 
perception of the Supreme Court as being comprised of nine justices blindly voting in partisan 
lock-step threatens to divest the entire system of the respect for process, and ultimately the belief 
in the rule of law.  Stare decisis helps to protect against such troubling prospects.  The inclusion 
of a challenged precedent’s reasoning in the Court’s stare decisis equation seeks to strike a balance 
between the need for practical transparency and the defense of the entire institution.  Codifying 
but limiting the standard supports the justifications for stare decisis in general: stability, 
 
282 Casey made it easier for states to restrict abortions, and Harris all but signaled the end of Abood. See Harris v. 
Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2652–53 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Readers of today’s decision will know that Abood 
does not rank on the majority’s top-ten list of favorite precedents—and that the majority could not restrain itself from 
saying (and saying and saying) so.”). 
283 This Comment and its focus are spurred on by the contention that few greater threats to the legal system exist than 
a deepening mistrust of the Supreme Court akin to the bitter partisan divide and general public disregard for the other 
two branches of government.  This proposal seeks to reinforce a doctrine—stare decisis—that inherently guards 
against such dangers.  
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predictability, and judicial legitimacy. Because the perceived sanctity of the process is a vital end 
unto itself, stare decisis should further sustain, not erode the perception of justice.   
